Post by Shuftin on Jul 29, 2006 7:23:03 GMT -5
Police and military use dogs for patrols and making arrests. State statutes and cases give police and military officers special protection when their dogs inflict injuries on people under certain circumstances. There is no protection, however, for excessive force, violating civil rights, or causing injuries outside the scope of proper law enforcement activities.
Courts have held that officers can use dogs to bite and hold a person suspected of commiting a crime, but only when it is reasonable to do so. In one case, the court held that it was unreasonable because the officers did not give the suspect a chance to surrender prior to using the dog, because of the circumstances present in that case. In other cases, however, courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Cases on both sides of the issue are contained in the next section.
These claims usually are brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Generally, that statute forbids police from using unreasonable force when making an arrest. If they do, then they may be required to compensate the victim. In some cases, the officers might be punished, including having to pay punitive damages to the victim. The federal civil rights laws give victims some advantages, possibly including an award of attorneys fees and costs, and sometimes a longer statute of limitations.
Cases involving police dogs and civil rights
The federal courts of appeal have analyzed a number of police dog cases. The courts have come up with different conclusions, depending on the facts of each case. Here are two cases that reached opposite conclusions.
Where the victim sued the police and won
In Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 328 F.3d 427 (8th Circuit 2003), a man who was bitten by a police dog successfully sued the city that employed the officers. The man had been stopped for a traffic violation. He ran away from his car, and officers pursued him with a police dog which had been trained to bite a suspect and hold him until officers commanded otherwise. The man's upper leg was bitten, and his femoral artery was severed.
The man sued both the city and the officers. He alleged that they used excessive force, a violation of his 4th Amendment rights and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His specific argument was that the police officers should have warned him and given him the opportunity to surrender peacefully before ordering the dog to bite and hold him.
The trial court sided with the city and the officers, but the 8th Circuit sided with the victim. The court said that excessive force claims are evaluated under an "objective reasonableness standard." This means that the force must have been warranted from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. The court held that releasing the dog without warning the man was objectively unreasonable. Warning him would not have put the officers at any increased risk.
Where the victim sued the police and lost
In Miller v. Clark County (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2003) 2003 DJDAR 9508, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the use of a police dog to bite and hold a potentially dangerous fleeing felon for up to a minute, until the situation is insured to be safe, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The facts of the case were as follows. A Clark County Sheriff’s Deputy on routine patrol at night spotted defendant driving a Pontiac Fiero. A registration check revealed that the Fiero had the wrong license plates, indicating at best a vehicle code violation and at worst that the car might be stolen. Defendant refused to pull over when the deputy activated his lights and siren. Defendant slowed and let out a passenger at the foot of a long driveway. The deputy ran after the passenger as he called for backup and as defendant drove up the driveway unpursued. Deputy Sheriff Edward Bylsma and
his dog “Kimon” arrived shortly thereafter and found the Pontiac unoccupied at the top of the driveway in front of the house. A 7 or 8-inch knife was on the vehicle’s seat. Other officers informed Deputy Bylsma that the occupants of the house were not “law enforcement friendly,” that a mentally ill person
lived there, and that defendant, who had an outstanding felony warrant for felony-evading, lived there with his parents. With information that defendant had been seen running away from the house a few minutes earlier, Deputy Bylsma and another deputy took Kimon and set out after him. They tracked
defendant across defendant’s parents’ large rural property, through underbrush and over electric fences, until finally reaching a dense, dark, wooded area.
Deputy Bylsma called out at that point, warning defendant that if he didn’t come out the police dog would be sent in after him. Hearing no response,
Kimon was let loose with a command that, in English, meant to search for the suspect and bite him in the arm or leg and hold him until told to let go. For the next minute, the dog could be heard charging through the brush until finally defendant’s scream was heard. It took another 45 seconds to a minute for Deputy Bylsma to find defendant with Kimon biting onto his upper arm. After it was determined that defendant was not armed, the command to let go was issued, and Kimon immediately complied. Defendant suffered serious wounds to his upper arm with skin, tissue and muscle being shredded all the way to the bone. Defendant later sued Deputy Bylsma and the Clark County Sheriff’s Department in federal court, per 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for using excessive force and thus violating his Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizure) rights.
The trial judge dismissed the allegation that “deadly force” was used, and, after a court trial, found that the force was not excessive under the circumstances. With his lawsuit dismissed, defendant appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, with almost a full page-long footnote (fn. #13) paying tribute to the history, attributes, and admirable qualities of
dogs in general, affirmed. Noting that the definition of “deadly force,” when discussing the use of a properly trained police dog, is “force reasonably
likely to kill” (as opposed to the traditional definition which also includes “force likely to cause great bodily injury”), the Court determined that more
than “a remote possibility of death” is required. While a police dog could certainly cause great bodily injury, and may even in unusual circumstances cause death, that is not enough to classify the use of such dogs as “force reasonably likely to kill.” Secondly, the Court found that the force used in this case, even though the dog was ordered to bite and hold the suspect, and which he did for up to a full minute, was not excessive under the circumstances.
In evaluating this issue, the Court balanced the defendant’s right not to be bitten by a police dog with the countervailing government interests at stake. The importance of the government’s interests is determined by analyzing (1) the type and amount of force inflicted, (2) the severity of the suspect’s crime, (3) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, (4) whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight, and (5) the government’s need for an intrusion upon the suspect’s rights when balanced with the gravity of that intrusion. Here, the deputies knew they had a fleeing felony suspect and had every reason to believe he might be dangerous. They had no way of knowing whether he might have with him a weapon more dangerous than the knife he left in the car. He resisted less intrusive methods of being subdued, including a verbal warning about the use of the dog.
Given the recognized importance of the government’s interest in arresting felony suspects, use of the dog in this case was not unreasonable. Also, having the dog hold onto defendant for up to a minute, despite the resulting aggravated damage to defendant’s arm, was reasonable under the circumstances. To cause Kimon to release the defendant before the deputies could get there and insure that defendant was not armed and would not continue his flight would have been a dangerous thing to do.
Courts have held that officers can use dogs to bite and hold a person suspected of commiting a crime, but only when it is reasonable to do so. In one case, the court held that it was unreasonable because the officers did not give the suspect a chance to surrender prior to using the dog, because of the circumstances present in that case. In other cases, however, courts have reached the opposite conclusion. Cases on both sides of the issue are contained in the next section.
These claims usually are brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Generally, that statute forbids police from using unreasonable force when making an arrest. If they do, then they may be required to compensate the victim. In some cases, the officers might be punished, including having to pay punitive damages to the victim. The federal civil rights laws give victims some advantages, possibly including an award of attorneys fees and costs, and sometimes a longer statute of limitations.
Cases involving police dogs and civil rights
The federal courts of appeal have analyzed a number of police dog cases. The courts have come up with different conclusions, depending on the facts of each case. Here are two cases that reached opposite conclusions.
Where the victim sued the police and won
In Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 328 F.3d 427 (8th Circuit 2003), a man who was bitten by a police dog successfully sued the city that employed the officers. The man had been stopped for a traffic violation. He ran away from his car, and officers pursued him with a police dog which had been trained to bite a suspect and hold him until officers commanded otherwise. The man's upper leg was bitten, and his femoral artery was severed.
The man sued both the city and the officers. He alleged that they used excessive force, a violation of his 4th Amendment rights and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His specific argument was that the police officers should have warned him and given him the opportunity to surrender peacefully before ordering the dog to bite and hold him.
The trial court sided with the city and the officers, but the 8th Circuit sided with the victim. The court said that excessive force claims are evaluated under an "objective reasonableness standard." This means that the force must have been warranted from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. The court held that releasing the dog without warning the man was objectively unreasonable. Warning him would not have put the officers at any increased risk.
Where the victim sued the police and lost
In Miller v. Clark County (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2003) 2003 DJDAR 9508, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the use of a police dog to bite and hold a potentially dangerous fleeing felon for up to a minute, until the situation is insured to be safe, does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
The facts of the case were as follows. A Clark County Sheriff’s Deputy on routine patrol at night spotted defendant driving a Pontiac Fiero. A registration check revealed that the Fiero had the wrong license plates, indicating at best a vehicle code violation and at worst that the car might be stolen. Defendant refused to pull over when the deputy activated his lights and siren. Defendant slowed and let out a passenger at the foot of a long driveway. The deputy ran after the passenger as he called for backup and as defendant drove up the driveway unpursued. Deputy Sheriff Edward Bylsma and
his dog “Kimon” arrived shortly thereafter and found the Pontiac unoccupied at the top of the driveway in front of the house. A 7 or 8-inch knife was on the vehicle’s seat. Other officers informed Deputy Bylsma that the occupants of the house were not “law enforcement friendly,” that a mentally ill person
lived there, and that defendant, who had an outstanding felony warrant for felony-evading, lived there with his parents. With information that defendant had been seen running away from the house a few minutes earlier, Deputy Bylsma and another deputy took Kimon and set out after him. They tracked
defendant across defendant’s parents’ large rural property, through underbrush and over electric fences, until finally reaching a dense, dark, wooded area.
Deputy Bylsma called out at that point, warning defendant that if he didn’t come out the police dog would be sent in after him. Hearing no response,
Kimon was let loose with a command that, in English, meant to search for the suspect and bite him in the arm or leg and hold him until told to let go. For the next minute, the dog could be heard charging through the brush until finally defendant’s scream was heard. It took another 45 seconds to a minute for Deputy Bylsma to find defendant with Kimon biting onto his upper arm. After it was determined that defendant was not armed, the command to let go was issued, and Kimon immediately complied. Defendant suffered serious wounds to his upper arm with skin, tissue and muscle being shredded all the way to the bone. Defendant later sued Deputy Bylsma and the Clark County Sheriff’s Department in federal court, per 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for using excessive force and thus violating his Fourth Amendment (unreasonable seizure) rights.
The trial judge dismissed the allegation that “deadly force” was used, and, after a court trial, found that the force was not excessive under the circumstances. With his lawsuit dismissed, defendant appealed.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, with almost a full page-long footnote (fn. #13) paying tribute to the history, attributes, and admirable qualities of
dogs in general, affirmed. Noting that the definition of “deadly force,” when discussing the use of a properly trained police dog, is “force reasonably
likely to kill” (as opposed to the traditional definition which also includes “force likely to cause great bodily injury”), the Court determined that more
than “a remote possibility of death” is required. While a police dog could certainly cause great bodily injury, and may even in unusual circumstances cause death, that is not enough to classify the use of such dogs as “force reasonably likely to kill.” Secondly, the Court found that the force used in this case, even though the dog was ordered to bite and hold the suspect, and which he did for up to a full minute, was not excessive under the circumstances.
In evaluating this issue, the Court balanced the defendant’s right not to be bitten by a police dog with the countervailing government interests at stake. The importance of the government’s interests is determined by analyzing (1) the type and amount of force inflicted, (2) the severity of the suspect’s crime, (3) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, (4) whether the suspect was actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight, and (5) the government’s need for an intrusion upon the suspect’s rights when balanced with the gravity of that intrusion. Here, the deputies knew they had a fleeing felony suspect and had every reason to believe he might be dangerous. They had no way of knowing whether he might have with him a weapon more dangerous than the knife he left in the car. He resisted less intrusive methods of being subdued, including a verbal warning about the use of the dog.
Given the recognized importance of the government’s interest in arresting felony suspects, use of the dog in this case was not unreasonable. Also, having the dog hold onto defendant for up to a minute, despite the resulting aggravated damage to defendant’s arm, was reasonable under the circumstances. To cause Kimon to release the defendant before the deputies could get there and insure that defendant was not armed and would not continue his flight would have been a dangerous thing to do.