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www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo14.htm
Police abuse remains one of the most serious and divisive human rights violations in the United States. The excessive use of force by police officers, including unjustified shootings, severe beatings, fatal chokings, and rough treatment, persists because overwhelming barriers to accountability make it possible for officers who commit human rights violations to escape due punishment and often to repeat their offenses.1 Police or public officials greet each new report of brutality with denials or explain that the act was an aberration, while the administrative and criminal systems that should deter these abuses by holding officers accountable instead virtually guarantee them impunity.
This report examines common obstacles to accountability for police abuse in fourteen large cities representing most regions of the nation. The cities examined are: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Portland, Providence, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. Research for this report was conducted over two and a half years, from late 1995 through early 1998.
The brutality cases examined, which are set out in detail in chapters on each city, are similar to cases that continue to emerge in headlines and in survivors' complaints. It is important to note, however, that because it is difficult to obtain case information except where there is public scandal and/or prosecution, this reportrelies heavily on cases that have reached public attention; disciplinary action and criminal prosecution are even less common than the cases set out below would suggest.
Our investigation found that police brutality is persistent in all of these cities; that systems to deal with abuse have had similar failings in all the cities; and that, in each city examined, complainants face enormous barriers in seeking administrative punishment or criminal prosecution of officers who have committed human rights violations. Despite claims to the contrary from city officials where abuses have become scandals in the media, efforts to make meaningful reforms have fallen short.
The barriers to accountability are remarkably similar from city to city. Shortcomings in recruitment, training, and management are common to all. So is the fact that officers who repeatedly commit human rights violations tend to be a small minority who taint entire police departments but are protected, routinely, by the silence of their fellow officers and by flawed systems of reporting, oversight, and accountability. Another pervasive shortcoming is the scarcity of meaningful information about trends in abuse; data are also lacking regarding the police departments' response to those incidents and their plans or actions to prevent brutality. Where data do exist, there is no evidence that police administrators or, where relevant, prosecutors, utilize available information in a way to deter abuse.2 Another commonality in recent years is a recognition, in most cities, about what needs to be done to fix troubled departments. However, this encouraging development is coupled with an official unwillingness to deal seriously with officers who commit abuses until high-profile cases expose long-standing negligence or tolerance of brutality.
One recent, positive development has been the federal "pattern or practice" civil investigations, and subsequent agreements, initiated by the U.S. Justice Department.3 In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Steubenville, Ohio, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division has examined shortcomings in accountability for misconduct in those cities' police departments; the cities agreed to implement reforms to end violative practices rather than risk the Justice Department taking a case to court for injunctive action. The reforms proposed by the Justice Department were similar to those long advocated by community activists and civil rights groups, and included better use-of-force training and policies, stronger reporting mechanisms, creation of early warning systems to identify current, and potential, officers at risk of engaging in abuse, and improved disciplinary procedures. The Justice Department does not usually make its investigative choices public, but several other police departments, including those in Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, and Philadelphia, are reportedly under investigation by the Civil Rights Division.
Police abuse experts, and some police officials, refer to "problem" officers, by which they mean officers who either have significant records of abuse or significant records of complaints from the public, and who thus should receive special monitoring, training and counseling to counter the heightened risk that they will be involved in some future incident of misconduct or brutality. In this report, we will use this terminology where police officials and experts use it, to denote officers who, on account of their record of either sustained or unsustained complaints, appear to present a higher than normal risk of committing human rights violations.
Allegations of police abuse are rife in cities throughout the country and take many forms. This report uses specific incidents as illustrations of the obstacles to deterring, investigating and acting upon perceived abuses. Human Rights Watch is presenting these cases not to accuse any particular officer of an abuse, but rather to describe the barriers that exist to addressing such allegations meaningfully. Any alleged abuse has a corrosive effect on public trust of the police force, and it is imperative that the system be reformed to prevent human rights violations such as those described below.
A seriously flawed background check of a new recruit who had a history of abusive behavior while working for another police department, apparent misuse of pepper spray, and poor investigation procedures were evident in the Aaron Williams case. (See San Francisco chapter for additional details.) Williams died while in the custody of San Francisco police officers after officers subdued him and sprayed him with pepper spray in the Western Edition neighborhood in June 1995. Williams, a burglary suspect, was bound with wrist and ankle cuffs,and according to witnesses was hit and kicked after he was restrained.4 Departmental rules apparently were broken when the officers used pepper spray repeatedly on Williams, who appeared to be high on drugs, and officers did not monitor his breathing as required.5 One of the officers involved in the incident, Marc Andaya, had reportedly been the subject of as many as thirty-five complaints while working with the Oakland police force before being hired by the San Francisco Police Department.6 In Oakland, his supervisor reportedly had urged desk duty for Andaya because of his "cowboy" behavior.7 It is not clear why the San Francisco Police Department hired Andaya in light of his background, but the press reported that Andaya may have given only a partial account of his complaint history and no thorough check was conducted.8 Andaya was accused of neglect of duty and using excessive force, but the city's Police Commission initially deadlocked on the charges (two for, two against, with one police commissioner absent), which was in effect an exoneration. In large part due to community outrage over the Williams case, Andaya was eventually fired for lying about his disciplinary background in his application.9
A record of brutality complaints, inadequate supervision, and the code of silence were illustrated in the Anthony Baez case in New York City. (See New York City chapter for additional details.) Baez, age twenty-nine, was choked to death during an encounter with police Officer Francis X. Livoti on December 22, 1994. Livoti had been the subject of at least eleven brutality complaints over an eleven-year period, including one that was substantiated by the city's civilian review board involving the choking of a sixteen-year-old who was allegedly riding a go-cart recklessly.10 In the Baez case, Livoti was acquitted of criminally negligent homicide in a judge-only trial ending in October 1996. But in finding the prosecution's case unproven, the judge nevertheless criticized conflicting and inconsistent officer testimony, citing a "nest of perjury" within the department.11 Livoti was then prosecuted administratively to ascertain, in part, whether he had broken departmental rules that prohibit applying a chokehold.12 Partially in response to substantial publicity and community outrage over Livoti's behavior, he was fired in February 1997 for breaking departmental rules.
The case of Frank Schmidt in Philadelphia illustrated flawed investigative procedures and lax discipline. (See Philadelphia chapter for additional details.) Officer Christopher Rudy was on duty but reportedly visiting friends and drinking alcohol at a warehouse in November 1993.13 A dispute arose between the warehouse owner and Frank Schmidt, with Schmidt accused of stealing items from the warehouse. Schmidt reportedly told investigators that the warehouse gates were locked behind him, a gun was put to his head, and he was beaten as Officer Rudy watched and poured beer over Schmidt's head. Throughout the ordeal, the warehouse owner reportedly threatened to cut off Schmidt's hands with a knife and to have warehouse workers rape him. Schmidt reported the incident to the police, but Rudy was not questioned for seven months and then denied everything. Rudy reportedly received a twelve-day suspension for failing to take police action and for conduct unbecoming a police officer; he was returned to active duty .14
Lax oversight and the failure to act quickly to dismiss an abusive officer while he was still on probation were evident in Minneapolis. (See Minneapolis chapter for additional details.) Officer Michael Ray Parent was convicted in state court of kidnaping and raping a woman in his squad car and was sentenced to four years in prison in April 1995. In the early morning hours of August 5, 1994, Officer Parent stopped and questioned the woman. She acknowledged she had been drinking, and he put her in the back seat of his squad car and told her she was under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. He then forced her to have oral sex with him. After the incident was reported, investigators found several prior complaints about Parent involving inappropriate sexual conduct while on duty, even though he had been on the force for only a year and a half before the August 1994 incident; he had been accused of a sexual incident during his probationary period on the force, when dismissals are much easier.15
Despite a civil jury trial leading to one of Indianapolis's largest awards following a judgment against an officer who fatally shot a burglary suspect, the officer remains on the force. (See Indianapolis chapter for additional details.) Officer Wayne Sharp, who is white, shot and killed Edmund Powell, who was black, in June 1991.16 Sharp, a veteran officer, claimed the shooting was accidental and that Powell had swung a nail-studded board at him, yet according to at least one witness, Powell was on the ground and had apparently surrendered when he was shot.17 According to witnesses, Powell allegedly stolesomething from a department store, and Sharp chased him into an alley with his gun drawn. The Marion County prosecutor brought the case before a grand jury, and it declined to indict Sharp on any criminal charges. Community activists claimed that the shooting was racially motivated; Sharp had killed a black burglary suspect ten years earlier and a grand jury had declined to indict him. At that time, Sharp reportedly was removed from street duty because of his "flirtation" with the National Socialist White People's Party, a neo-Nazi group.18 Powell's grandmother, Gertrude Jackson, alleging Sharp intentionally shot Powell, filed a civil lawsuit in 1992; the jury found in favor of Jackson and awarded $465,000 to Powell's family.19 The city had not paid Jackson as of September 1997, and the status of any appeal was unclear.20 Despite his history, Sharp was still on duty as of mid-1997 and according to the police chief there has received "high accolades and several awards for superior work."21
A ranking New Orleans officer who himself was responsible for enforcing internal rules had a long history of abuse complaints, some sustained, but was only dismissed after he was convicted of a crime. (See New Orleans chapter for additional details.) Lieutenant Christopher Maurice was the subject of more than a dozen discourtesy and brutality complaints before being charged and convicted on two counts of simple battery in November 1995 (and fired two weeks later). The charges stemmed from a June 1994 incident in which Lt. Maurice allegedly slammed the head of radio personality Richard Blake (knownas Robert Sandifer) against the police car's hood.22 Just after this encounter, Maurice was found in violation of department rules for getting into an argument and nearly a fistfight with a fellow officer during ethics training in early 1994. Also in June 1994, Maurice was served a warrant for another battery charge in St. Tammany Parish. Prior to the 1994 incidents, he had been suspended once (allegedly for brandishing his gun at a neighbor) and reprimanded twice since 1985, according to his civil service records. In a 1991 civil suit, the city paid a $25,000 settlement to a man who claimed that Maurice had hit him in the head with his police radio. Despite this record, Maurice was the commander in charge of enforcing the internal rules of the department. The city's citizen review agency (an external monitoring office) reportedly investigated several of the complaints against Maurice but did not uphold any of them as valid.
Human Rights Watch recognizes that police officers, like other people, will make mistakes when they are under pressure to make split-second decisions regarding the use of force. Even the best recruiting, training, and command oversight will not result in flawless behavior on the part of all officers. Furthermore, we recognize that policing in the United States is a dangerous job. During 1996, 116 officers died while on duty nationwide (from all causes - shootings, assaults, accidents, and natural causes).23 Yet, precisely because police officers can make mistakes, or allow personal bias or emotion to enter into policing - and because they are allowed, as a last resort, to use potentially lethal force to subdue individuals they apprehend - police must be subjected to intense scrutiny.24
The abuses described in this report are preventable. Officers with long records of abuse, policies that are overly vague, training that is substandard, and screening that is inadequate all create opportunities for abuse. Perhaps most important, and consistently lacking, is a system of oversight in which supervisors hold their charges accountable for mistreatment and are themselves reviewed and evaluated, in part, by how they deal with subordinate officers who commit human rights violations. Those who claim that each high-profile case of abuse by a "rogue" officer is an aberration are missing the point: problem officers frequently persist because the accountability systems are so seriously flawed.
Police, state, and federal authorities are responsible for holding police officers accountable for abusive or arbitrary acts.25 Police officials must ensure that police officers are punished when they violate administrative rules, while state and federal prosecutors must prosecute criminal acts committed by officers, and where appropriate, complicity by their superior officers.26 Each of these entities apply different standards when reviewing officer responsibility for an alleged abuse.27 All of these authorities have an obligation to ensure that the conduct of police officersmeets international standards that prohibit human rights violations and that, in general, the U.S. complies with the obligations imposed by those treaties to which it is a party. While only the federal government is responsible for reporting internationally on U.S. compliance with the relevant treaties, local and state officials share responsibility for ensuring compliance within their jurisdictions.28
1 "Excessive force" is used throughout this report to refer to force that exceeds what is objectively reasonable and necessary in the circumstances confronting the officer to subdue a person, as in Article 3 of the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (see appendix H), which provides that: "Law enforcement officials should use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty." GA resolution 34/169 passed on December 17, 1979, and in the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which stipulates that, "Whenever the use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990). In Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that that the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment requirement of "reasonableness" on the part of the police applies to "all claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free person." Throughout this report, the term "excessive force" refers to abuse occurring both during apprehension and while in custody. This report also describes sexual assaults and torture by police officers which are not, strictly speaking "excessive" use of force, but are unjustified and criminal assaults.
2 In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the U.S. Justice Department was tasked with collecting data on the frequency and types of abuse complaints filed nationwide. At the time of this writing, nearly four years later, no such report has been issued. (See below.)
3 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 included a new statute under which the Justice Department may sue for declaratory relief (a statement of the governing law) and equitable relief (an order to abide by the law with specific instructions describing actions that must be taken) if any governmental authority or person acting on behalf of any governmental authority engages in: "a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers...that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." "Police Pattern or Practice" 42 U.S.C. ยง14141.
4 Mary Curtius, "Despite Progressive Policies, S.F. Police, Public at Odds," Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1997. Officer Marc Andaya was reportedly injured during the incident.
5 Officers also reportedly placed a surgical mask on Williams during the encounter and the mask was discarded at the scene; examination of the mask may have made clear whether pepper spray was used after Williams was subdued or if its use contributed to his death by restricting breathing. Rachel Gordon and Katherine Seligman, "Did cops skirt rules in death of suspect?" San Francisco Examiner, June 8, 1995.
6 Susan Sward, "S.F. panel fires officer in Aaron Williams case," San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1997.
7 Jim Herron Zamora, "S.F. cop cleared of using excess force," San Francisco Examiner, November 21, 1996.
8 Jim Herron Zamora, "Cop kicked suspect's head, say 3 witnesses," San Francisco Examiner, October 8, 1996; Zamora, "S.F. cop cleared of using excess force," San Francisco Examiner, November 21, 1996.
9 Susan Sward, "S.F. panel fires officers," San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1997.
10 Clifford Krauss, "Case casts wide light on abuse by police," New York Times, April 15, 1995.
11 In September 1997, the Bronx District Attorney's office announced it would reopen its perjury inquiry involving fifteen officers of the 46th Precinct, where Livoti worked.
12 Of the fourteen city police departments examined by Human Rights Watch, only four - San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Minneapolis - still allow chokeholds. 1993 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 1993, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C., pp. 169-180.
13 Mark Bowden, "Major offenses by Philadelphia cops often bring minor punishments," Philadelphia Inquirer, November 19, 1995; and case files of off-duty actions provided to Temple University Prof. James Fyfe by the police department's Internal Affairs Division. He compiled case studies titled "Philadelphia police off-duty actions: Complaints and Shootings," May 23, 1994.
14 Telephone confirmation of Rudy assignment with Philadelphia Police Department, August 11, 1997.
15 Pat Pheifer, "Minneapolis officer held on charges of assault," Minneapolis Star Tribune, September 2, 1994.
16 Erica Franklin, "Witness saw suspect prone before officer shot him," Indianapolis Star, April 18, 1995.
17 Ibid.
18 Sherri Edwards and Erica Franklin, "Jury finds police officer guilty of intentionally killing suspect," The Indianapolis Star, April 22, 1995; U.P.I., "FBI probes police shooting," June 20, 1991; "Police confrontations," Indianapolis News, July 27, 1995.
19 Howard M. Smulevitz, "Jury award could bust IPD's bank," Indianapolis Star, April 25, 1995.
20 Welton W. Harris II, "Officer loses fatal shooting suit," Indianapolis News, April 22, 1995; Sherri Edwards and Erica Franklin, "City may appeal verdict giving slain man's family $465,000," Indianapolis Star, April 23, 1995; telephone interview with Greg Ray of the Office of Corporation Counsel, July 28, 1997.
21 Letter to Human Rights Watch from Chief Michael H. Zunk, dated January 26, 1998.
22 Maurice's appeal of his battery conviction was pending at the time of this writing.
23 National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, online at www.1nleomf.com/ and the Associated Press, December 31, 1996. The 1996 death total was the lowest since 1959. Of the 116, more officers died from traffic accidents, falls, plane crashes and heart attacks than by acts of criminal suspects or others (shootings, stabbings, or assaults). During 1997, 159 law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty, including seventy who were shot to death. During the 1990s, 151 officers have been killed annually, on average.
24 Principle 4 of the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials states, "[L]aw enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
25 Principle 7 of the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials state, "Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence under their law." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
26 U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, calls for accountability for superior officers: "Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are held responsible if they know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials under their command are resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force and firearms, and they did not take all measures in their power to prevent, suppress or report such use. Principle 24. UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
27 There are several standards used by different entities when reviewing officer responsibility for an alleged abuse. In civil cases, a "preponderance of the evidence" standard is used. A more rigorous standard is used in state criminal cases (for charges such as assault, manslaughter, murder, etc.), "beyond a reasonable doubt," and in federal criminal civil rights cases, a prosecutor must also prove that the officer in question specifically intended to deprive an individual of his or her civil rights. Whether in state or federal court, an officer must be indicted by a grand jury before standing trial. And, when an officer is administratively charged by his police department for breaking the department's rules, the standard should be the same as in civil cases - preponderance of the evidence - but in practice is often similar to a criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
www.hrw.org/reports98/police/uspo14.htm
Police abuse remains one of the most serious and divisive human rights violations in the United States. The excessive use of force by police officers, including unjustified shootings, severe beatings, fatal chokings, and rough treatment, persists because overwhelming barriers to accountability make it possible for officers who commit human rights violations to escape due punishment and often to repeat their offenses.1 Police or public officials greet each new report of brutality with denials or explain that the act was an aberration, while the administrative and criminal systems that should deter these abuses by holding officers accountable instead virtually guarantee them impunity.
This report examines common obstacles to accountability for police abuse in fourteen large cities representing most regions of the nation. The cities examined are: Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Portland, Providence, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. Research for this report was conducted over two and a half years, from late 1995 through early 1998.
The brutality cases examined, which are set out in detail in chapters on each city, are similar to cases that continue to emerge in headlines and in survivors' complaints. It is important to note, however, that because it is difficult to obtain case information except where there is public scandal and/or prosecution, this reportrelies heavily on cases that have reached public attention; disciplinary action and criminal prosecution are even less common than the cases set out below would suggest.
Our investigation found that police brutality is persistent in all of these cities; that systems to deal with abuse have had similar failings in all the cities; and that, in each city examined, complainants face enormous barriers in seeking administrative punishment or criminal prosecution of officers who have committed human rights violations. Despite claims to the contrary from city officials where abuses have become scandals in the media, efforts to make meaningful reforms have fallen short.
The barriers to accountability are remarkably similar from city to city. Shortcomings in recruitment, training, and management are common to all. So is the fact that officers who repeatedly commit human rights violations tend to be a small minority who taint entire police departments but are protected, routinely, by the silence of their fellow officers and by flawed systems of reporting, oversight, and accountability. Another pervasive shortcoming is the scarcity of meaningful information about trends in abuse; data are also lacking regarding the police departments' response to those incidents and their plans or actions to prevent brutality. Where data do exist, there is no evidence that police administrators or, where relevant, prosecutors, utilize available information in a way to deter abuse.2 Another commonality in recent years is a recognition, in most cities, about what needs to be done to fix troubled departments. However, this encouraging development is coupled with an official unwillingness to deal seriously with officers who commit abuses until high-profile cases expose long-standing negligence or tolerance of brutality.
One recent, positive development has been the federal "pattern or practice" civil investigations, and subsequent agreements, initiated by the U.S. Justice Department.3 In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Steubenville, Ohio, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division has examined shortcomings in accountability for misconduct in those cities' police departments; the cities agreed to implement reforms to end violative practices rather than risk the Justice Department taking a case to court for injunctive action. The reforms proposed by the Justice Department were similar to those long advocated by community activists and civil rights groups, and included better use-of-force training and policies, stronger reporting mechanisms, creation of early warning systems to identify current, and potential, officers at risk of engaging in abuse, and improved disciplinary procedures. The Justice Department does not usually make its investigative choices public, but several other police departments, including those in Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, and Philadelphia, are reportedly under investigation by the Civil Rights Division.
Police abuse experts, and some police officials, refer to "problem" officers, by which they mean officers who either have significant records of abuse or significant records of complaints from the public, and who thus should receive special monitoring, training and counseling to counter the heightened risk that they will be involved in some future incident of misconduct or brutality. In this report, we will use this terminology where police officials and experts use it, to denote officers who, on account of their record of either sustained or unsustained complaints, appear to present a higher than normal risk of committing human rights violations.
Allegations of police abuse are rife in cities throughout the country and take many forms. This report uses specific incidents as illustrations of the obstacles to deterring, investigating and acting upon perceived abuses. Human Rights Watch is presenting these cases not to accuse any particular officer of an abuse, but rather to describe the barriers that exist to addressing such allegations meaningfully. Any alleged abuse has a corrosive effect on public trust of the police force, and it is imperative that the system be reformed to prevent human rights violations such as those described below.
A seriously flawed background check of a new recruit who had a history of abusive behavior while working for another police department, apparent misuse of pepper spray, and poor investigation procedures were evident in the Aaron Williams case. (See San Francisco chapter for additional details.) Williams died while in the custody of San Francisco police officers after officers subdued him and sprayed him with pepper spray in the Western Edition neighborhood in June 1995. Williams, a burglary suspect, was bound with wrist and ankle cuffs,and according to witnesses was hit and kicked after he was restrained.4 Departmental rules apparently were broken when the officers used pepper spray repeatedly on Williams, who appeared to be high on drugs, and officers did not monitor his breathing as required.5 One of the officers involved in the incident, Marc Andaya, had reportedly been the subject of as many as thirty-five complaints while working with the Oakland police force before being hired by the San Francisco Police Department.6 In Oakland, his supervisor reportedly had urged desk duty for Andaya because of his "cowboy" behavior.7 It is not clear why the San Francisco Police Department hired Andaya in light of his background, but the press reported that Andaya may have given only a partial account of his complaint history and no thorough check was conducted.8 Andaya was accused of neglect of duty and using excessive force, but the city's Police Commission initially deadlocked on the charges (two for, two against, with one police commissioner absent), which was in effect an exoneration. In large part due to community outrage over the Williams case, Andaya was eventually fired for lying about his disciplinary background in his application.9
A record of brutality complaints, inadequate supervision, and the code of silence were illustrated in the Anthony Baez case in New York City. (See New York City chapter for additional details.) Baez, age twenty-nine, was choked to death during an encounter with police Officer Francis X. Livoti on December 22, 1994. Livoti had been the subject of at least eleven brutality complaints over an eleven-year period, including one that was substantiated by the city's civilian review board involving the choking of a sixteen-year-old who was allegedly riding a go-cart recklessly.10 In the Baez case, Livoti was acquitted of criminally negligent homicide in a judge-only trial ending in October 1996. But in finding the prosecution's case unproven, the judge nevertheless criticized conflicting and inconsistent officer testimony, citing a "nest of perjury" within the department.11 Livoti was then prosecuted administratively to ascertain, in part, whether he had broken departmental rules that prohibit applying a chokehold.12 Partially in response to substantial publicity and community outrage over Livoti's behavior, he was fired in February 1997 for breaking departmental rules.
The case of Frank Schmidt in Philadelphia illustrated flawed investigative procedures and lax discipline. (See Philadelphia chapter for additional details.) Officer Christopher Rudy was on duty but reportedly visiting friends and drinking alcohol at a warehouse in November 1993.13 A dispute arose between the warehouse owner and Frank Schmidt, with Schmidt accused of stealing items from the warehouse. Schmidt reportedly told investigators that the warehouse gates were locked behind him, a gun was put to his head, and he was beaten as Officer Rudy watched and poured beer over Schmidt's head. Throughout the ordeal, the warehouse owner reportedly threatened to cut off Schmidt's hands with a knife and to have warehouse workers rape him. Schmidt reported the incident to the police, but Rudy was not questioned for seven months and then denied everything. Rudy reportedly received a twelve-day suspension for failing to take police action and for conduct unbecoming a police officer; he was returned to active duty .14
Lax oversight and the failure to act quickly to dismiss an abusive officer while he was still on probation were evident in Minneapolis. (See Minneapolis chapter for additional details.) Officer Michael Ray Parent was convicted in state court of kidnaping and raping a woman in his squad car and was sentenced to four years in prison in April 1995. In the early morning hours of August 5, 1994, Officer Parent stopped and questioned the woman. She acknowledged she had been drinking, and he put her in the back seat of his squad car and told her she was under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. He then forced her to have oral sex with him. After the incident was reported, investigators found several prior complaints about Parent involving inappropriate sexual conduct while on duty, even though he had been on the force for only a year and a half before the August 1994 incident; he had been accused of a sexual incident during his probationary period on the force, when dismissals are much easier.15
Despite a civil jury trial leading to one of Indianapolis's largest awards following a judgment against an officer who fatally shot a burglary suspect, the officer remains on the force. (See Indianapolis chapter for additional details.) Officer Wayne Sharp, who is white, shot and killed Edmund Powell, who was black, in June 1991.16 Sharp, a veteran officer, claimed the shooting was accidental and that Powell had swung a nail-studded board at him, yet according to at least one witness, Powell was on the ground and had apparently surrendered when he was shot.17 According to witnesses, Powell allegedly stolesomething from a department store, and Sharp chased him into an alley with his gun drawn. The Marion County prosecutor brought the case before a grand jury, and it declined to indict Sharp on any criminal charges. Community activists claimed that the shooting was racially motivated; Sharp had killed a black burglary suspect ten years earlier and a grand jury had declined to indict him. At that time, Sharp reportedly was removed from street duty because of his "flirtation" with the National Socialist White People's Party, a neo-Nazi group.18 Powell's grandmother, Gertrude Jackson, alleging Sharp intentionally shot Powell, filed a civil lawsuit in 1992; the jury found in favor of Jackson and awarded $465,000 to Powell's family.19 The city had not paid Jackson as of September 1997, and the status of any appeal was unclear.20 Despite his history, Sharp was still on duty as of mid-1997 and according to the police chief there has received "high accolades and several awards for superior work."21
A ranking New Orleans officer who himself was responsible for enforcing internal rules had a long history of abuse complaints, some sustained, but was only dismissed after he was convicted of a crime. (See New Orleans chapter for additional details.) Lieutenant Christopher Maurice was the subject of more than a dozen discourtesy and brutality complaints before being charged and convicted on two counts of simple battery in November 1995 (and fired two weeks later). The charges stemmed from a June 1994 incident in which Lt. Maurice allegedly slammed the head of radio personality Richard Blake (knownas Robert Sandifer) against the police car's hood.22 Just after this encounter, Maurice was found in violation of department rules for getting into an argument and nearly a fistfight with a fellow officer during ethics training in early 1994. Also in June 1994, Maurice was served a warrant for another battery charge in St. Tammany Parish. Prior to the 1994 incidents, he had been suspended once (allegedly for brandishing his gun at a neighbor) and reprimanded twice since 1985, according to his civil service records. In a 1991 civil suit, the city paid a $25,000 settlement to a man who claimed that Maurice had hit him in the head with his police radio. Despite this record, Maurice was the commander in charge of enforcing the internal rules of the department. The city's citizen review agency (an external monitoring office) reportedly investigated several of the complaints against Maurice but did not uphold any of them as valid.
Human Rights Watch recognizes that police officers, like other people, will make mistakes when they are under pressure to make split-second decisions regarding the use of force. Even the best recruiting, training, and command oversight will not result in flawless behavior on the part of all officers. Furthermore, we recognize that policing in the United States is a dangerous job. During 1996, 116 officers died while on duty nationwide (from all causes - shootings, assaults, accidents, and natural causes).23 Yet, precisely because police officers can make mistakes, or allow personal bias or emotion to enter into policing - and because they are allowed, as a last resort, to use potentially lethal force to subdue individuals they apprehend - police must be subjected to intense scrutiny.24
The abuses described in this report are preventable. Officers with long records of abuse, policies that are overly vague, training that is substandard, and screening that is inadequate all create opportunities for abuse. Perhaps most important, and consistently lacking, is a system of oversight in which supervisors hold their charges accountable for mistreatment and are themselves reviewed and evaluated, in part, by how they deal with subordinate officers who commit human rights violations. Those who claim that each high-profile case of abuse by a "rogue" officer is an aberration are missing the point: problem officers frequently persist because the accountability systems are so seriously flawed.
Police, state, and federal authorities are responsible for holding police officers accountable for abusive or arbitrary acts.25 Police officials must ensure that police officers are punished when they violate administrative rules, while state and federal prosecutors must prosecute criminal acts committed by officers, and where appropriate, complicity by their superior officers.26 Each of these entities apply different standards when reviewing officer responsibility for an alleged abuse.27 All of these authorities have an obligation to ensure that the conduct of police officersmeets international standards that prohibit human rights violations and that, in general, the U.S. complies with the obligations imposed by those treaties to which it is a party. While only the federal government is responsible for reporting internationally on U.S. compliance with the relevant treaties, local and state officials share responsibility for ensuring compliance within their jurisdictions.28
1 "Excessive force" is used throughout this report to refer to force that exceeds what is objectively reasonable and necessary in the circumstances confronting the officer to subdue a person, as in Article 3 of the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (see appendix H), which provides that: "Law enforcement officials should use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty." GA resolution 34/169 passed on December 17, 1979, and in the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, which stipulates that, "Whenever the use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990). In Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that that the United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment requirement of "reasonableness" on the part of the police applies to "all claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free person." Throughout this report, the term "excessive force" refers to abuse occurring both during apprehension and while in custody. This report also describes sexual assaults and torture by police officers which are not, strictly speaking "excessive" use of force, but are unjustified and criminal assaults.
2 In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the U.S. Justice Department was tasked with collecting data on the frequency and types of abuse complaints filed nationwide. At the time of this writing, nearly four years later, no such report has been issued. (See below.)
3 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 included a new statute under which the Justice Department may sue for declaratory relief (a statement of the governing law) and equitable relief (an order to abide by the law with specific instructions describing actions that must be taken) if any governmental authority or person acting on behalf of any governmental authority engages in: "a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers...that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States." "Police Pattern or Practice" 42 U.S.C. ยง14141.
4 Mary Curtius, "Despite Progressive Policies, S.F. Police, Public at Odds," Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1997. Officer Marc Andaya was reportedly injured during the incident.
5 Officers also reportedly placed a surgical mask on Williams during the encounter and the mask was discarded at the scene; examination of the mask may have made clear whether pepper spray was used after Williams was subdued or if its use contributed to his death by restricting breathing. Rachel Gordon and Katherine Seligman, "Did cops skirt rules in death of suspect?" San Francisco Examiner, June 8, 1995.
6 Susan Sward, "S.F. panel fires officer in Aaron Williams case," San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1997.
7 Jim Herron Zamora, "S.F. cop cleared of using excess force," San Francisco Examiner, November 21, 1996.
8 Jim Herron Zamora, "Cop kicked suspect's head, say 3 witnesses," San Francisco Examiner, October 8, 1996; Zamora, "S.F. cop cleared of using excess force," San Francisco Examiner, November 21, 1996.
9 Susan Sward, "S.F. panel fires officers," San Francisco Chronicle, June 28, 1997.
10 Clifford Krauss, "Case casts wide light on abuse by police," New York Times, April 15, 1995.
11 In September 1997, the Bronx District Attorney's office announced it would reopen its perjury inquiry involving fifteen officers of the 46th Precinct, where Livoti worked.
12 Of the fourteen city police departments examined by Human Rights Watch, only four - San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Minneapolis - still allow chokeholds. 1993 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, 1993, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Washington, D.C., pp. 169-180.
13 Mark Bowden, "Major offenses by Philadelphia cops often bring minor punishments," Philadelphia Inquirer, November 19, 1995; and case files of off-duty actions provided to Temple University Prof. James Fyfe by the police department's Internal Affairs Division. He compiled case studies titled "Philadelphia police off-duty actions: Complaints and Shootings," May 23, 1994.
14 Telephone confirmation of Rudy assignment with Philadelphia Police Department, August 11, 1997.
15 Pat Pheifer, "Minneapolis officer held on charges of assault," Minneapolis Star Tribune, September 2, 1994.
16 Erica Franklin, "Witness saw suspect prone before officer shot him," Indianapolis Star, April 18, 1995.
17 Ibid.
18 Sherri Edwards and Erica Franklin, "Jury finds police officer guilty of intentionally killing suspect," The Indianapolis Star, April 22, 1995; U.P.I., "FBI probes police shooting," June 20, 1991; "Police confrontations," Indianapolis News, July 27, 1995.
19 Howard M. Smulevitz, "Jury award could bust IPD's bank," Indianapolis Star, April 25, 1995.
20 Welton W. Harris II, "Officer loses fatal shooting suit," Indianapolis News, April 22, 1995; Sherri Edwards and Erica Franklin, "City may appeal verdict giving slain man's family $465,000," Indianapolis Star, April 23, 1995; telephone interview with Greg Ray of the Office of Corporation Counsel, July 28, 1997.
21 Letter to Human Rights Watch from Chief Michael H. Zunk, dated January 26, 1998.
22 Maurice's appeal of his battery conviction was pending at the time of this writing.
23 National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, online at www.1nleomf.com/ and the Associated Press, December 31, 1996. The 1996 death total was the lowest since 1959. Of the 116, more officers died from traffic accidents, falls, plane crashes and heart attacks than by acts of criminal suspects or others (shootings, stabbings, or assaults). During 1997, 159 law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty, including seventy who were shot to death. During the 1990s, 151 officers have been killed annually, on average.
24 Principle 4 of the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials states, "[L]aw enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of achieving the intended result." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
25 Principle 7 of the U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials state, "Governments shall ensure that arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials is punished as a criminal offence under their law." UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
26 U.N. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, calls for accountability for superior officers: "Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are held responsible if they know, or should have known, that law enforcement officials under their command are resorting, or have resorted, to the unlawful use of force and firearms, and they did not take all measures in their power to prevent, suppress or report such use. Principle 24. UN Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990).
27 There are several standards used by different entities when reviewing officer responsibility for an alleged abuse. In civil cases, a "preponderance of the evidence" standard is used. A more rigorous standard is used in state criminal cases (for charges such as assault, manslaughter, murder, etc.), "beyond a reasonable doubt," and in federal criminal civil rights cases, a prosecutor must also prove that the officer in question specifically intended to deprive an individual of his or her civil rights. Whether in state or federal court, an officer must be indicted by a grand jury before standing trial. And, when an officer is administratively charged by his police department for breaking the department's rules, the standard should be the same as in civil cases - preponderance of the evidence - but in practice is often similar to a criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt."