JusticeFiles.org maybe gone, but not forgotten

[KC]

JusticeFiles.org, maybe gone but the information that was on the site has been saved and I may just mirror the site one day myself. If anyone would like the information that was on JusticeFiles.org, E-mail me and I would be glad to give it to you. The most "juicy" information from the site is from the Kirkland Police Dept.

The last "known" mirror site that was up and running, has been shut down sometime in the last few weeks. No doubt the work of the D.O.J.

For those not familiar with JusticeFiles.org, I'll post some stories below.

Again anyone interested about getting the information from JusticeFiles.org, just e-mail me on this message board.

[KC]

Justicefiles.org interview
Monday, May 27, 2002


Interview with William Sheehan of Justice Files.org, conducted by Ragnar Danneskjold, editor - Planetgold.com. E-mail Ragnar for questions or to suggest an interview at [e-mail].

planetgold: Today, Planetgold is pleased to interview William Sheehan, of Justice Files.org.

planetgold: Welcome, William. Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed.

William: I’m happy to oblige.

planetgold: Tell us a little about yourself.

William: I'm 40, live in Mill Creek Washington, married. My career is in Computers as an MCSE and have over 15 years experience in all kinds of internetwork engineering. I'm a veteran of the Navy, and have lots of college under my belt.

planetgold: Why did you start www.justicefiles.org?

William: Washington state has a common problem with the rest of the country:
Police are totally unaccountable for their actions here. The event that gave me the idea to start this site took place back in December of 1998. Back then, a friend was going through a messy divorce where his now ex-wife made a claim to the Kirkland police that she was assaulted by him. It turns out that I was there at the time the alleged assault took place and it simply didn't happen. I gave testimony to the Kirkland police of what I saw, or didn't see. In about two weeks, officer Goguen of the Kirkland police telephoned me to tell me he thought I was a liar and that he'll have his way with me, in a rather hostile tone. I told him, "...you sir can kiss my white hairy American ass if you think I'm going to be intimidated by this kind of treatment..." I hung up on him.

Being one not to have some ignorant cop talk to me in that way, I came up with the idea to investigate him and his entire department and air it to the entire world.

planetgold: Sounds like a good idea. Has anyone else attempted this?

William: Not that I know of or not to the level that I have done.

planetgold: Whose toes are you stepping on and why?

William: I would guess I'm stepping on the toes of every cop within earshot of this issue. From their motions filed in court, they feel threatened having their information so easily available. The trouble is all of it is part of the public record.

planetgold: Do you think they will succeed in shutting you down? Has anyone stepped in to help yet by mirroring your site, perhaps in another state or country?

William: The site will live on. A mirror will be up an running Monday in the Netherlands and it will clearly state the new site as a mirror, as long as that site is legal. I will tell you the name Monday (top secret).

planetgold: What are some of the major constitutional issues involved here?

Washington State wants to censor

William: Most importantly, the First Amendment. Our government in Washington State wants to censor this information and have crafted a law to do just that. They are in effect shooting the messenger. Elena Garella, my attorney, is much better suited to answer these questions.

planetgold: Have you been contacted by any of the principals in this matter?

William: Not once have I been contacted by the Kirkland police or their counsel since that initial conversation between officer Goguen and myself in December of 1998.

planetgold: Have you tried contacting them to try to settle the matter amicably?

William: There were settlement talks going on for several months and a deal was close. However, I got to the point that selling my constitutional rights was something I could not do. You see, I'm a veteran and I feel a very strong sense of duty to my country and the Bill of Rights.

planetgold: Does your site accept digital currencies, such as e-gold for donations?

William: Hmmm. Not yet. Hadn't considered it.

planetgold: How can the interested public help your cause?

William: Donations would help as all of that would go to my attorney, Elena Garella. The biggest help would be for people to mirror the site and send me the links to post on the site. Calling the Washington State lawmakers to point out their failure to understand the ubiquitous nature of the Internet would be helpful as well.

planetgold: It seems you are fighting to preserve an equitable system where law enforcement should be held accountable and not become an elitist organization, out of reach from public scrutiny.

William: You got it.

planetgold: But what do you say to critics who claim that providing this information in an easy to use interface, where all the information is at one's fingertips, may make it easier for violent criminals to hunt down a law enforcement officer and seek retribution? Are there cases where you would condone the use of your system for retribution?

William: First of all, I say to critics, "I'm doing something, sticking my neck out and standing behind my words. What are you doing?"
That issue aside, I would never condone any kind of illegal retribution. If someone has to hold their rights up and deal with a public official in court, get an attorney and do it legally. Follow my example, and do it by the book; and that IS the most effective way to bring change.

planetgold: If it came to your attention that your site is used for just such a purpose, what would you do? Would you change anything? Would you feel responsible?

William: These are the big questions today. Let me answer that in the most cogent way that I can.
I would feel EXACTLY the same responsibility for releasing this data, even if it were used for criminal purposes as the following organizations, for they gave it to me:

All Washington County Voter Registration Records (home addresses, Voting patterns)
U.S. District Court (SSN's, addresses, crimes and suits)
U.S. Bankruptcy Court (SSN's, addresses and credit data)
All Washington County Real Property Assessment Records (addresses and taxpayer information)
Experian (everything and credit header information)
Trans Union (everything and credit header information)
Equifax (everything and credit header information)
Kirkland Police (Names, salaries, job titles)
All other Police Departments listed on the site.

The list goes on. What is important here is that I'm not the one giving it out. It has always been out there. I have only made it just a little bit easier and more organized.

In a bit of a summary, what I have done here is a natural course of technology. Granted I have the constitution to deal with all the lawsuits this has generated (5 and counting) that is a bit more than the average Joe. But to me, I don't have a choice. I live here too, and I do care. Not in my lifetime will there ever be a bunch of jackbooted, nameless, faceless storm-troopers without me doing anything about it.

With my tax dollars comes my rhetoric. GUARANTEED!

planetgold: Thanks, Bill, and good luck.

72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:x3qjjux8PdQJ:www.planetgold.com/interview.asp%3FSPID%3D30390671+justicefiles&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=5

[KC]

Last week, Judge Robert H. Alsdorf ordered justicefiles.org to delete
Social Security numbers of police officers from its web site. (The
case, as you probably recall, was brought by the city of Kirkland,
Washington, and my Politech article about the ruling is what drew
legal threats from their lawyers this week.)

Details are still sketchy, but a reliable source tells me that it
wasn't intentional. The story goes like this, according to the source:

Bill Sheehan, publisher of justicefiles.org, was approached by someone claiming to be affiliated with hackers-for-hire.com.

Hackers-for-hire.com is based in Toronto, Canada. They offered a cheap web hosting deal, and Bill took it. But once the site was up -- and, crucially, the domain name switched over -- to their server, Bill got locked out and the SSNs reappeared. Now the SSNs are online in arguable violation of the court order, and Bill wants everyone to know that he can't take them down even if he wanted to, and he does.

Bill is trying to change the DNS to point to a legal version of the site, and has contacted Domain Bank, but DNS changes take some time to propagate

My command-line whois query shows that the record was updated Thursday, and justicefiles.org has three DNS servers listed: NS1.GRANITECANYON.COM, DNS.ZENCOR.ORG, and
DNS-1.EXTREME-FREAK-SHOW.COM.

Oddly, a query of Network Solution's whois database shows their record was updated Friday, and includes just two servers:

DEMOS.JUSTICEFILES.ORG and NS1.JUSTICEFILES.ORG.

Those appear to be inside the network of eli.net, a Washington state firm. See for yourself:

www.networksolutions.com/cgi-bin/whois/whois?STRING=justicefiles.org

Translation: The SSNs are back and may remain there for up to 24 hours while activists gleefuly mirror the content -- unless Bill can persuade a bunch of Toronto hackers that they should take a U.S. judge's order seriously. Fat chance.

Also, I wanted to thank everyone who emailed support for my own legal battle with Kirkland. It's heartening to know that there are so many people who care about free speech, though we should all be doing something else on a Friday night.

-Declan

[KC]

Washington Supreme Court slaps down judge's no-posting injunction in Paul Trummel case

-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Wash. Supreme court clarifies long-running Trummel
harassment/web posting censorship
Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2006 19:05:02 -0400
From: Ethan Ackerman <[e-mail]>
Reply-To: <[e-mail]>
To: Declan McCullagh <[e-mail]>

Greetings Declan,

Your recent post on police retaliation against muckraking journalists
mentioned the Washington state case of Paul Trummel.
Politech readers might be interested to know that the Washington state
Supreme court just (3/30/06) released an opinion in that case.

In a nutshell, the state Supreme Court generally upheld most of the lower
court anti-harassment orders barring Mr. Trummel from contacting and
surveilling residents of the (partially HUD-funded) building, regardless of
his allegedly journalistic intentions, BUT reversed the lower court orders
to the extent they restricted publication of information (even personally
identifying details) on his website.

The Supreme Court recognized the 1st Amendment issues associated with
restricting Internet publication, but chose to resolve the issue on narrower
grounds; the relevant anti-harassment statute allowed a judge to prohibit
'surveillance,' but posting info to the Internet wasn't 'surveillance,' so
the judge couldn't prohibit the posting.

The lawsuits and anti-harassment orders drew several journalism and civil
liberties amici, including some good work from the ACLU of Washington's
Aaron Caplan. Also, Elena Luisa Garella - whom Politech readers may
remember as the attorney in the justicefiles.org police posting lawsuits -
served as Mr. Trummel's attorney.

Opinion:
www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/?fa=opinions.opindisp&docid=759774MAJ

ACLU (and associated attorneys) Amicus: (from earlier stage in the
litigation)
www.contracabal.org/NewFiles/LD-03-1015-0000.pdf

(The American Society of Journalists and Authors amicus was good too,
unfortunately I didn't find it online in a brief search.)


Best,
-Ethan





-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: [Politech] Police in Florida strike back at critical
journalist through the Web [fs]
Date: Mon, 03 Apr 2006 17:38:16 -0700
From: Bob Simpson <[e-mail]>
To: Declan McCullagh <[e-mail]>
References: <[e-mail]>

At 04:10 PM 4/3/2006, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>And then there's the similar case involving Paul Trummel, a Washington
>state writer who set up the contracabal.org site, although he was
>writing about an HUD-funded housing project, not the police:
>http://www.politechbot.com/p-03664.html

Poking around on the 'net WRT this item:
www.theolympian.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060331/NEWS06/60331052


>Published March 31, 2006
>High court overrules trial court in dispute over Web site
>By DONNA GORDON BLANKINSHIP
>
>The Associated Press
>
>SEATTLE - The state Supreme Court has ruled that a trial court
>overreached its authority when it extended an anti-harassment order
>to restrict information on a Web site.
>
>Paul Trummel, former resident of a retirement home that was the
>subject of his Web site, was jailed for 111 days in 2002 for
>refusing to edit the site to comply with a judge's order. His
>attorney, William John Crittenden, called Thursday's unanimous
>ruling a "strange decision" but indirectly a victory for free speech.
>
>"At the end of the day, the determination that Paul was in contempt
>for putting things on the Internet has been reversed," Crittenden said.
>
[...]
>Trummel continues to use his Web site to attack Council House,
>judges who have ruled in his case and to express opinions on a
>variety of other issues.
>
>Names and contact information about Council House residents and
>staff could not be found on the site Thursday afternoon. Trummel
>removed the information after his 2002 release from jail.
[...]

Posted by Declan McCullagh on Apr 04, 2006 in category free-speech

www.politechbot.com/2006/04/04/washington-supreme-court/

[KC]

I don't think anyone could say anything nice about King County Superior Court Judge Robert Alsdorf.

He should be fed to a pack of dogs and eaten alive.

[KC]

Here's what the little prick had to say back in 2001.


IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

CITY OF KIRKLAND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

WILLIAM SHEEHAN et ux. et al.,

Defendants. )
)
)
)
)
)

No. 01-2-09513-7 SEA

MEMORANDUM RULING RE: PLAINTIFFS' MOTION
FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
)
)

Defendants operate a website critical of law enforcement personnel. Their
website contains not only substantive political argument but also lists of
names, addresses, birthdates, telephone numbers, Social Security numbers
("SSNs") and other personal information concerning law enforcement personnel
and their relatives.
Plaintiffs assert that this publication of their personal information
invades their privacy interests and is causing them continuing injury.
Plaintiffs have therefore asked the Court to issue preliminary and permanent
injunctive relief prohibiting the publication of these lists.
In response, defendants argue that their activities are protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution and therefore cannot be
prohibited.

1. The Question of Privacy
As a matter of logic and common sense, the degree of an individual's privacy
is necessarily a reflection of two distinct matters: the amount of access
others have to his or her personal information, and the extent to which
others may be able to disseminate or otherwise act upon any information to
which they do obtain access.
Both parties agree that this case is at the frontier of internet law, and
that publication of private information on the internet may demand a form of
analysis different from that historically applied in the United States to
questions of privacy. This Court must therefore briefly examine the
development of case law concerning privacy.
(a) The Historical Treatment of Privacy
Our Founding Fathers appear to have given little direct thought in the
writing of the Constitution to any need to take action to protect one's
privacy from other citizens. At that time, citizens were effectively
required to keep their distance from each other through the basic and
relatively simple laws of trespass and of libel. While neighbors may then,
as now, have known all there was to know about their neighbors, scant
information about the general populace was held by governmental entities.
What little information the government had compiled could generally only be
accessed by clerks with quill pens working their way through musty books and
ledgers.
Even if private information were acquired in that day by a citizen, it could
be disseminated principally by walking down the street and talking to
whoever would listen, or providing the information to a printer who could
only set the type letter by tedious letter. As a practical matter,
therefore, real-life barriers protected personal information from being
invaded or broadly published by others. Widespread dissemination to
strangers would generally occur only when the matter was of public interest.
In the case of full-blown political speech, including that which might
divulge personal details on a particular opponent, there were similar
natural barriers to its spread. Rabble-rousing words once uttered on the
corner or from the top of a soapbox disappeared on the wind, remaining only
in the ears of those few who may have been inspired to action or remaining
on the pages of a newspaper or pamphlet whose life-span would be directly
controlled by the physical problems inherent in distribution and retention.
At that time, the theory was that there was a marketplace of ideas. Speech
was to be free. Those ideas that survived would be those whose inherent
worth or value were recognized and accepted by the general public. The
remaining or unworthy ideas would die a natural death. This was a search for
truth which rested on the premise that

when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.

(Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)(Holmes, J., dissenting).)

In such a setting, when addressing the question of how best to establish a
democracy and protect individual freedom, the Founders focused on the rights
of the people against the government, not their privacy rights against other
citizens. In the Fourth Amendment, for example, they affirmed the citizens'
right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures [by the government]." In the Third
Amendment, they limited governmental power by restricting the quartering of
soldiers in private homes without the consent of the owners. In the First
Amendment, they prohibited the government from making any law "abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The
Founders said nothing about being free from the prying eyes of other
citizens.
(b) The Internet's Impact on Privacy
Speech is not today limited to the human voice. Nor is it limited to media
such as paper, tape or film, whose dissemination is affected by their
physical natures. It takes place in countless electronic forums, not only
on radio and television whose transmission waves themselves may quickly
dissipate, but also on what is commonly called the "worldwide web."
Government agencies, businesses and electronic media and service providers
accessible on the internet can create a permanent record of almost anything
that is said or done by any citizen, one which can be instantaneously
disseminated around the world and still remain accessible to be retrieved
virtually indefinitely.
Except for those Americans who are homeless or who are migrant workers, and
those who choose to live as hermits, we all leave electronic footprints
identifying ourselves and recording virtually every activity we undertake.
The Founders never directly addressed that which they could not contemplate:
these pervasive modern-day public and private means of electronic intrusion
into a person's home and daily life, particularly the emergence of
electronic records recording the details of an individual's every action.
When accessed, such information can be published around the world upon the
click of a button. This continuing assault on privacy and individual
autonomy was unimaginable two hundred years ago.
2. The Issue for this Court
No challenge is raised at this time to the legality of defendants' prior
access to plaintiffs' private information. The only question presented in
this Motion is whether plaintiffs can, by asserting a right to privacy, stop
the dissemination of any or all personal information that has come into the
defendants' hands.
(a) Washington State Law Addresses Only the Question of Access to
Information
In the State of Washington there is a Constitutional provision which appears
to address privacy. Article 1, Section 7, which was adopted in 1889, states
simply, "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law." This Constitutional provision has been
interpreted as relating solely to possible governmental intrusion into
private affairs. See, e.g., State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506 (1984). It
therefore provides no assistance in resolving this dispute.
Washington State statutes provide certain limits on the right of others to
gain access to private information when it is held by governmental entities.
RCW 42.17.310(1)(b) provides generally that government agencies may not
disclose information that would "violate...the right to privacy" of
governmental employees and public officials. RCW 42.17.310(1)(u)
proscribes disclosure of residential addresses and telephone numbers of
agency employees and volunteers.
Washington case law is similarly limited. See, PAWS v. University of
Washington, 125 Wn.2d 243 (1995) (preventing a private entity from obtaining
access to certain personal information of employees who worked with animals
when conducting scientific research); and Tacoma Public Library v. Woessner,
90 Wn.App. 205 (Div. II, 1998) (limiting access to personal information).
On its face, each case and each statutory provision deals only with what the
government is authorized to do when requested to provide a private person or
entity access to personal information pertaining to another. None addresses
the extent to which an individual who has apparently lawful possession of
private or personal information may, consistent with the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution, be enjoined from disseminating that
information.

(b) Federal Constitutional Law Focuses on First Amendment Rights

When dealing with alleged invasions of one citizen's privacy by another
citizen, federal courts have generally analyzed the issues only from the
point of view of the First Amendment. As a general proposition, restraints
on speech are presumed to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980). Thus, courts focus on the question of
whether there has been proof of a compelling governmental interest which can
overcome the First Amendment right. See, e.g., The Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
While there are readily accepted remedies after the fact, such as monetary
damages for libelous or other wrongful speech, injunctions are rarely
granted to stop the exercise of free speech except in those rare
circumstance where it poses an immediate danger to others, such as uttering
direct and credible threats to kill or injure. Injunctions are allowed for
speech that is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to induce or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 440, 447 (1969). In the absence of evidence of such threats, speech
generally cannot be enjoined, however repugnant, offensive or distasteful it
may otherwise be.
When issuing rulings which explicitly focus on and protect a citizen's right
to privacy, the Supreme Court has referred to privacy as being found in a
"penumbra" surrounding the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.
See, generally, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-5 (1965).
However, even these discussions of privacy have generally arisen only in the
context of a citizen's right to be free from governmental intrusion (as, for
example, in Griswold, the right to be free from government intrusion in
family reproductive decisions). These Supreme Court decisions do not address
a citizen's right to privacy from other citizens.
In the recent ruling issued in Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Willamette, Inc., et al., v. American Coalition of Life Activists,
et al., F.3d , 2001 WL 293260 (9th Cir., 2001), the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt with the question of injunctive and
monetary relief against persons and organizations running a website
captioned the "Nuremberg Files" on which were published photographs,
addresses and other personal information on doctors and others who provided
or supported abortion services. This website struck through the names of
those who had been murdered and grayed out the names of those who had been
wounded. In that case, both injunctive relief and damages had been granted
in the federal trial court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
political speech "may not be punished just because it makes it more likely
that someone will be harmed at some unknown time in the future by an
unrelated third party." (Id., at p. 3, citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, supra.)
The Supreme Court characterized that website's statements as "pungent, even
highly offensive" and as approving of violence but the Court found no threat
of "imminent" harm. The Court explicitly declined to decide whether the
First Amendment would protect defendants from a suit for invasion of
privacy, Ibid., p. 4, fn. 10.
In Capra v. Thoroughbred Horse Racing Ass'n. of N. Am., Inc., 787 F.2d 463,
465 (9th Cir.), cert. den. 479 U.S. 1017 (1986), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that even protecting the identity of a witness participating
in the federal Witness Protection program is not by itself enough to
overcome the First Amendment.
In sum, the First Amendment prevails except where there is proof of a
compelling interest which can overcome it.
3. May Plaintiffs Obtain Injunctive Relief?
The Court must now analyze the facts of this case.

(a) The Nature of Defendants' Speech
This case arises from defendants' listing of detailed personal information
relating to the law enforcement personnel of the City of Kirkland and of
other jurisdictions, including not only the names of these individuals, but
addresses, dates of birth, telephone numbers, SSNs, their spouses' names and
other similar information.
Plaintiffs object that these listings are causing stress to them and their
families, and have required them to enhance security measures and expend
funds in response. This is not an unreasonable reaction. Defendants agreed
that they intend to cause at least some degree of fear and apprehension in
the minds of law enforcement personnel when they stated at the close of
their primary web page on April 25, 2001:

So the next time anyone in our criminal justice system takes any action, we
hope they think of this site first, then act knowing that they too are
locatable and accountable at a much more personal level than ever before and
in doing so, treat every citizen, criminal and hero alike with the utmost
respect and dignity. That is the kind of attitude can (sic) only foster
respect and cooperation between all members of our great society.

(See, Exhibit A to Decl. of Sheehan, at p. 3; emphasis added.)
Defendants' site offers to remove this personal information pertaining to
police officers in any jurisdiction that will officially "admit" that police
officers are public officials, that will agree to accept service for
officers, and that creates a civilian review board having a certain
composition. (Ibid., at p. 4.) This suggestion of a willingness to trade
back plaintiffs' privacy for certain policy changes could be argued to bear
some resemblance to blackmail.
(b) The Nature of Plaintiffs' Privacy Interest
Privacy rights are implicated when personal information is published or
disseminated, it is highly offensive to a reasonable person, and the matters
are not of legitimate concern to the public. See, e.g., Reid v. Pierce
County, 136 Wn.2d 195 (1998). Defendant Sheehan's counsel conceded in oral
argument that defendants' publication of plaintiffs' personal information is
highly offensive to reasonable persons. Defendants themselves acknowledge
on their web-page that some might find their listings to be
"objectionable...tasteless...an invasion of privacy... [or] shocking."
(See, Ex. A to Decl. of Sheehan, at p. 2.) They argue that they have posted
the information "so that it may be used in conjunction with legal processes
and for general information we as employers require in order to supervise
our public servants."
Defendants argue that even if their speech is otherwise objectionable, it is
not truly private because plaintiffs have waived their objections by
allowing such information to be recorded by others. The Court rejects this
argument. Participation in modern society is not to be taken as a voluntary
blanket waiver of privacy. None of us has a choice of moving from this
millenium to a different time. No evidence has been presented by defendants
demonstrating a specific affirmative act of waiver of privacy by any
plaintiff herein as to any of the information published by defendants.
Defendants also argue as to their speech that it is free of charge, that it
is political, and that it should not be given less protection than is
available to internet credit/location/search services which are commercial.
It is true that defendants' site is free, and is available world-wide. That
necessarily means that at any time anybody anywhere in the world could
obtain access to plaintiffs' private information. It is hard to conceive of
a broader invasion of privacy than freely disseminating the information to
the entire world and rendering it instantaneously accessible to all.
In contrast, while the commercial services or speech may be argued to have a
lower ranking than political speech in the pantheon of the First Amendment,
the commercial dissemination of personal information and thus the invasion
of privacy is naturally more limited. A person generally has no access to
private information on a commercial site unless he identifies himself and
pays for the service, and in some cases verifies the purpose of his access.

In terms of privacy, the dissemination of personal information by commercial
enterprises is more limited than the dissemination by defendants. Moreover,
these sites are not unfettered. They are carefully regulated. See, e.g.,
the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1681 et seq..
Simply put, such sites may invade privacy, but they do so to a lesser
degree.
(c) Does the First Amendment Protect Defendants' Speech?
The immediate question for this Court is similar to that addressed in Capra,
supra. Can a publication, which defendants concede to be something of an
infringement on privacy, be considered to relate to a matter of legitimate
interest to the public, and in that manner pass muster?
Upon the facts presented to date in this case, reprehensible though some may
find defendants' proposed bargain to be (trading privacy for policy
changes), it is clear that defendants' utterances are indeed political
speech. In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 929 (1982), the
Supreme Court ruled that publicly reading the names of persons who
disregarded a boycott and threatening that they would be "disciplined" and
saying "we're gonna break your damn neck" could be viewed as intending to
create a fear of violence but was not sufficient to grant relief because the
speaker had not thereby "authorized, ratified or directly threatened" acts
of violence.
In this case, as in numerous others, in the absence of a credible specific
threat of harm, the publication of lawfully obtained addresses and telephone
numbers, while certainly unwelcome to those who had desired a greater degree
of anonymity, is traditionally viewed as having the ability to promote
political speech. Publication may arguably expose wrongdoers and/or
facilitate peaceful picketing of homes or worksites and render other
communication possible.
However, Social Security numbers are different from addresses and telephone
numbers. The blanket identification of the Social Security numbers of a
group of people, without more, does not provide a similar opportunity for or
otherwise facilitate or promote substantive communication. It cannot
reasonably be disputed that at its core the SSN is simply a
government-originated identifying number. It is a key or a tool, created by
the government and unique for each individual. Access to an individual's
SSN enables a new holder to obtain access to and to control, manipulate or
alter other personal information. See, e.g., Greidinger v. Davis, 988 F.2d
1344, 1353-54 (4th Cir., 1993). In effect, access to an SSN allows a
person, agency or company to more efficiently and effectively search for and
seize information and assets of another, a power originally available only
to the government and one which was subject to direct Constitutional
restraint.
On its face, the SSN is a tag or an identifier which at best has only a
distant possibility of a substantive communicative purpose. Keeping Social
Security numbers private is a compelling interest for the government and
citizens alike. As the Supreme Court of our State noted in PAWS, supra, at
254, "the disclosure of a public employee's Social Security number would
be... not of legitimate concern to the public." There may be situations
involving specific individuals where the publication of a Social Security
number could relate to a public issue and therefore constitute substantive
speech, but defendants have presented no such facts here as to any
individual plaintiff.
(d) Injunctive Relief
This Court has concluded that on the facts presented so far to this Court
defendants' dissemination of legally obtained private addresses and phone
numbers and similar private information is speech protected by the First
Amendment, and may not be enjoined. However, plaintiffs do have the right
to protect their Social Security numbers from further dissemination: there
is a compelling interest in keeping Social Security numbers private; the
disclosure of that information is highly offensive to the reasonable person;
it is not of legitimate concern to the public; and waiver has not been
proved as to any plaintiff.
Thus, as to Social Security numbers, plaintiffs have met their burden of
proving (1) a legal or equitable right, (2) as to which there is a
well-grounded fear of immediate invasion, and (3) the acts complained of
have resulted and will result in actual and substantial injury. Kucera v.
State, 140 Wn.2d 200, 209 (2000).
The Court will issue an injunction directing the removal of all SSNs from
defendants' web site.
4. May plaintiffs seek other forms of relief?
This case was filed recently. No significant discovery has occurred.
Damages may be available to a plaintiff who proves that the defendant had
the specific intent to cause the plaintiff severe mental or emotional
distress by his invasion(s) of the plaintiff's privacy. Planned Parenthood,
supra, at p. 4, fn. 10. See also, Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F.Supp. 664 (N.D.
Tex., 1998).
This Court does not yet have a record on which any finder of fact could
determine whether that level of specific intent could be proved in this
case.
The parties are therefore to prepare for trial, and to develop evidence
concerning all of plaintiffs' legal and equitable claims of injury and
defendants' defenses thereto.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10th day of May, 2001.


_______________________________

Judge Robert H. Alsdorf
KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

[KC]

Our Judge which Art an Identity
Public Be Thy Name

Thy Decision Wrong
Thy will be done online, just as on public record

Give us this day our constitutional prerogatives
And forgive us our mockery, as we forgive invasions of privacy.

And lead us not to speak code
Or break code, using art

For thy Social Security is Government Scrutiny, governed by bad legislation.

Amen

Justicefiles.org positions itself as "a revolutionary attempt to provide accountability in government on a scale never before seen in this country (or for that matter, the world)." The site offers access to a database of police officers; prosecutors and "those that are part of the criminal justice system" as compiled from court records, including the publication of home addresses, phone numbers, Social Security numbers and other personal information. A recent and somewhat misguided ruling by a Washington Judge ordered the proprietors of the web site to remove the Social Security numbers on the Kirkland portion the site, after the City of Kirkland filed a suit asserting that this publication of their personal information "invades their privacy interests and is causing them continuing injury."

In his May 10, 2001 ruling, Judge Robert H. Alsdorf stated the following:

While there are readily accepted remedies after the fact, such as monetary damages for libelous or other wrongful speech, injunctions are rarely granted to stop the exercise of free speech except in those rare circumstance where it poses an immediate danger to others, such as uttering direct and credible threats to kill or injure. Injunctions are allowed for speech that is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to induce or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 440, 447 (1969). In the absence of evidence of such threats, speech generally cannot be enjoined, however repugnant, offensive or distasteful it may otherwise be.
However, in his final determination, Judge Alsdorf distinguished between certain material that he thought should be published, such as legally obtained private addresses and phone numbers and similar private information, which he felt were protected by the First Amendment, and just the Social Security numbers that he thought were entitled to privacy. Citing a "compelling interest in keeping Social Security numbers private," Alsdorf issued an injunction directing the removal of all SSNs from defendants' web site.
Following the injunction, Elena Luisa Garella, (a Seattle attorney representing one of the publishers of the site, William Sheehan), sent an email to Wired News reporter Declan McCullagh detailing the basic premise of the decision. McCullagh decided to test the court, asserting:

"I believe that same information is available from public court records and other lawful public sources, and I'm including it here for journalistic purposes -- to demonstrate what kind of information the site in question has."
So McCullagh sent an email to an email list he maintains containing a list of three social security numbers that were taken from the justcefiles.org web site. He further archived the email on his web site politechbot.com. On May 14, 2001, The City of Kirkland's lawyers at Preston Gates sent him a letter ordering him to delete the three Social Security numbers from his site.
McCullagh took his position on this case, he states: "because it highlights how nebulous 'privacy rights' are being used to limit free expression."

We felt the same way about the alleged privacy argument the government used in United States v. ApolloMedia to try and impose a prior restraint on our speech by gagging us while simultaneously attempting to garner private information about the users of our site. A prolonged battle all the way to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, (and one that effectively gagged employees of ApolloMedia, my attorneys, and myself for nearly a year) finally resulted in a First Amendment victory for ApolloMedia, parent of annoy.com.

Rather than retell the story, McCullagh granted annoy.com permission to reproduce his emails, as we have done below. In so doing, some interesting legal, journalistic, artistic and ethical issues arise.

Firstly, the information McCullagh published on his web site is now published on ours. Since the government itself has recognized and treated us as a journalistic entity, what McCullagh has done and the injunction against justicefiles.org constitutes legitimate news and deals with issues, which we have a compelling interest in covering and which visitors to our site have in learning.

Further, the accompanying graphic representation of this story is designed to provoke thought and pose questions: What is code, what is art, what is speech?

If a publicly available document containing information such as a Social Security number that a Judge has found within the constitution to order private, is the display of one of those numbers backwards constitutionally protected?

And while the reflection of the number in a mirror might appear to be the exact number, can mirror images of information publicly available be prohibited? What about upside down? Or as a postcard?

Since the ruling applies only to justicefiles.org, can an entity like annoy.com be restricted by a prior restraint from publishing information that is both publicly available and newsworthy, or simply art, as the case may be?

While we strongly disagree with the Judges injunction and our distaste for prior restraints automatically triggers a defensive reaction, there are a few items worth noting.

The government engaged in the unconstitutional filing of ex-parte motions in United States vs. ApolloMedia and the federal magistrate in Houston did little more than serve as a rubber stamp with a terse one sentence ruling. Judge Alsdorf at least did more than many trial courts would do, by trying to explain in reasons and in public, his decision.

In a telephone conversation with Elena Luisa Garella, she expressed frustration at the ruling insofar as the extent to which it relied on misinformation documented in the City of Kirklands Motion that Sheehan had based his opposition to the City's Motion on the defense of "waiver." The relevance here is that the entire burden of proof was thus shifted from plaintiff having to prove the information was private to begin with to defendant having to establish the affirmative defense of waiver.

What Sheehan actually argued was that the preliminary injunction should not be issued because the City of Kirkland failed to present evidence proving that the identifying information was in fact "private facts." One of the essential elements of the City's case is the burden of demonstrating that the information was private before it was posted on Sheehan's web sites.

While Garella's frustration and response to the injunction make sense, there are additional reasons the court was wrong. Namely that the First Amendment prohibition against prior restraints is so strong and because the privacy interest on the facts is really weak.

It is still an unsettled question whether the publication of truthful private facts, that constitute a far worse and terrible invasion of privacy, is entitled to First Amendment protection. Given the recent Supreme Court decision in Barnicki v. Vopper and other recent rulings, indicators suggest that even the High Court would likely rule that publication of the most private of information is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.

Judges like others make mistakes all the time. As Alsdorf pointed out, the area of law in this area is still unclear and presents unique and interesting challenges that the founding fathers could not have imagined when drafting the constitution.

The undeniable fact, which thankfully safeguards against prior restraints on speech, is that the Internet facilitates an immediate means of undermining them by publication of the very material that is enjoined. On a global scale way beyond the jurisdiction of the court issuing the Order. Already, in this case, Canadian hackers are reported to have hijacked the URL and were able to publish the information enjoined by the Order. And of course, there are always mirror sites that spring up like moles in these situations.

Our decision to publish the graphic, McCullagh's emails and this editorial is unequivocal. Judges need to understand that prior restraints on speech yield detrimental consequences. All too often, the issuing of prior restraints does little more than invite violation and sharpen the focus of what may have otherwise remained in relative obscurity. Our position is consistent with our commitment to freedom of expression, the relevance of this case to our own experiences relating to prior restraint and to point out clearly that prior restraints should not be issued and do not work. No matter how well-intended a prior restraint may be, it is flagitious, perhaps even more so when accompanied by sweet reason rather than the gag orders of a precisian.

www.annoy.com/editorials/doc.html?DocumentID=100120